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* In consolidating its North American
and European product development
into ®ve Vehicle Program Centers
(VPCs) to develop cars for all
markets, integrating its manufac-
turing, supply, marketing and sales
into a worldwide operation, Ford is
moving from a so-called multi-
domestic strategy to a global one.
* The question is if this is the right
strategy for an automobile company
that wants to offer new low cost
and/or differentiated products to its
customers worldwide.
* This article advances three points:
* First, that although the strategic
change is appropriate, it may not
have gone far enough.
* Second, to get the best out of the
strategy, in any case, Ford must
implement it well, moulding the
right organizational structure,
systems/processes, and the right
people in the right positions.
* Third, it must integrate into its
systems, the right information and
communications technologies.
Optimal performance requires a ®t
between strategy, structure, systems/
processes and people.
1This article is adapted from the author's book, Innovation Management: Strategies, Implementation and Pro®ts,
published by Oxford University Press.
On April 21, 1994, Ford Motor Company
announced that effective from January 1,
1995, it would merge its North American
Automotive Operations, European Automatic
Operations and Ford Automotive Operations
(FAO). Product development, previously un-
dertaken independently by each operation,
would be integrated into ®ve Vehicle Program
Centers (VPCs) with each having worldwide
responsibility for the design, development and
engineering of any vehicle assigned to it.
Manufacturing, production purchasing, mar-
keting and sales operations would also be
integrated worldwide. The ®rm was effec-
tively moving from a multidomestic strategy
in which each of its North American and
European operations independently devel-
oped products to serve its own market, to a
global strategy in which the company would
have one operation that develops products for
worldwide markets. The question is, will this
strategic change allow Ford to better inno-
vate Ð keep using new knowledge to offer
low cost and/or differentiated cars that world-
wide customers want? This paper argues that
the new strategy should put Ford in a better
position to innovate. But whether it pays
dividends for Ford depends on how the
company implements it. Optimal bene®ts
from a strategic change only come with the
appropriate changes in organizational struc-
ture, the
systems/processes that support both the
strategy and structure, and the people who
must carry out the implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. First, I present the theoretical back-
ground that will allow us to evaluate Ford's
new strategy. Next, I explore what Ford 2000
is all about. Then I provide an analysis of the
strategy and its implementation. Finally, I offer
some conclusions.
Background
In order to analyse Ford's new strategy, it is
important to understand, ®rst, what strategic
options are available to a multinational
corporation (MNC) for exploiting innovation
worldwide and, second, what it takes to
successfully implement these strategies.
Generic strategies for worldwide
innovation
For a ®rm to keep making pro®ts, it must keep
offering low cost and/or differentiated
products (Porter, 1991). To do so, it must
innovate; it must use new knowledge to offer
new products that customers want. In
positioning itself to innovate for worldwide
markets, a multinational would like two
things. First, it would like to be close to
customers in each country so as to better
discern and respond to changes in customer
tastes, preferences, expectations, government
policies and other local idiosyncrasies. On the
other hand, since some nations provide a
more conducive environment for developing
certain products than others (Thomas, 1989;
Porter, 1990), a ®rm would also like to take
advantage of such environments. For exam-
ple, a ®rm may want to locate in the US's
Silicon Valley if it makes microchips. Thus, the
strategies that a ®rm can use to exploit
innovation worldwide can be classi®ed as a
function of two contingencies: how close a
®rm has to be to customers in order to better
respond to local needs, and the extent to
which it has to update the technological
knowledge that underpins the innovationÐ
the need to be near a Silicon Valley or close to
a home country's endowments. These classi-
®cations are shown in Figure 1 with the
contingencies labelled `market information
needs' and `technological information needs',
respectively (Afuah, 1997).
The multidomestic strategy is appropriate
for innovations that depend a lot more on
understanding local customer preferences,
tastes, expectations, distribution channels
and local government regulations than they
do on the technological knowledge on which
these innovations rest (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1989). That is, as shown in Figure 1, this
strategy is appropriate when the need for
market information is high while that for
technological information is low. Makers of
packaged consumer goods (detergents and
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cereals) such as Unilever have pursued this
strategy (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Firms
that pursue the multidomestic strategy have
self-suf®cient units in each country to better
discern local customer preferences and tastes.
On the other hand, if technological informa-
tion requirements are high relative to market
information requirements, a ®rm may want to
pursue a global strategy.2 Firms can locate
their facilities where the environment is most
suitable for technological innovations or at
home where they have home endowments
that give them some advantage. From there,
they develop products for world markets. For
example, Intel has located its plants in the US
(especially in the Silicon Valley) and served
the world from there with some peripheral
help from overseas units such as a chip design
centre in Israel. If both market and techno-
logical information demands are low, a ®rm
can operate using the international strategy.
It can take advantage of its home capabilities
to develop products for its home market.
Once the products are successful at home, it
can then transfer the capabilities and innova-
tion to overseas. McDonald's has used this
strategy very successfully, moving into Europe
and China only after `perfecting' the hambur-
ger at home. If both market and technological
information needs are high, the transnational
strategy is best. In this strategy, ®rms have
access to the best sources of innovation, and
the technological and market knowledge that
underpins them, worldwide.
The choice of a globalization
strategy is the ®rst step in
exploiting innovation
worldwide
The choice of a globalization strategy is just
the ®rst step in exploiting innovation world-
wide. The strategy must be implemented well.
In particular, the ®rm needs an organizational
structure, systems and the people that are
appropriate for the strategic change (Figure
2). The structure of a ®rm tells us who is
supposed to report to whom and who is
responsible for what. Systems/processes pro-
vide management with a means to monitor
performance, reward and punish individuals,
functions, divisions and organizations in some
agreed upon and understood way. They also
provide a means whereby information will
¯ow in the shortest possible time to the right
targets for decision making (Hill and Jones,
1995, p 352). Whether the people who will
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2The words global and international as used in this
categorization of different strategies can be confusing
given the normal everyday uses. In this paper, they are
used only in this context Ð as strategies.
Figure 1. Strategies for innovating worldwide. Reprinted
by permission of Oxford University Press.
Figure 2. The strategy±structure±systems±people im-
perative.
carry out all the innovation tasks are moti-
vated or not, or take the right decisions with
the available information is also critical Ð it is
a function of the type of people in the
organization. It is a function of many ques-
tions: To what extent do employees share the
same goals as their ®rm? Does the manufactur-
ing group see R&D as a `bunch of ivory tower,
money-spending snobs' or colleagues with
whom they can work to build the best
products in the shortest possible time at the
lowest cost? To what extent do the employees
have the knowledge that underpins the
various activities of the ®rm's value chain?
And so on.
Before Ford 2000
In 1994 when the programme called Ford
2000 was announced, Ford's ®nancial posi-
tion looked very strong. Its 1994 pro®ts from
its automotive operations were $3.8 billion.
There are, however, two things wrong with
the rosy picture that the ®gure paints. In the
®rst place, the ®rm's automotive operations
had lost $3.769 billion and $1.775 billion in
1991 and 1992, respectively. As Figure 3
shows, the automobile industry was in the
upswing of one of its cycles and Chrysler
performed better than Ford. Could this
upswing in which everyone makes money
be hiding a less than optimal strategy? Second,
and most important, market performance
measures like pro®ts, ROI and stock prices
can hide problems that are brewing in a
company just waiting to surface later. Ford
had its share of them. While Chrysler's pretax
margins on automobiles were 11.6%, Ford's
were 5.4% (Treece et al., 1995). While it took
Ford ®ve years to redesign its Taurus, its
Japanese competitors took less than two years
to introduce competing models. Toyota made
37 cars a year per worker while Ford only
made 20 (The Economist, 1996).3 The
company's recent model, called the Mondeo
in Europe and the Contour/Mystique in North
America had cost $6 billion to develop and
launch. This cost was four times that of
competitors.
Since the introduction of its Taurus in 1985,
its ®rst `home run' since the Mustang and
Thunderbird, there had been no other home
runs, not even triples. The company's much-
touted quality programmes may not have
prevented it from becoming complacent
following the Taurus. Ford's attempt to make
its European-designed Escort a world car that
used common parts but that could be
assembled in different parts of the world
failed. Each geographical region ended up
redesigning the car, duplicating cost. In the
United States, only six of the car's 5000 parts
remained in common with the European
Escort's; one of the six was the radiator cap
(Pelofsky and Schleisinger, 1991).
Underlying these troubling signals was an
innovation-sti¯ing organization. Ford's opera-
tions in different parts of the world Ð Ford of
Europe, North American Automotive Opera-
tions and Ford Asia Paci®c Automotive
Operations Ð all developed, manufactured
and sold their products independently.
Although this focus on regions allowed Ford
to, theoretically, be more responsive to local
customer needs, it deprived the company of
the bargaining power over suppliers that only
combined worldwide operations could pro-
vide. Such bargaining power would not only
give a manufacturer some price advantages, it
would give it ®rst access to critical compon-
ent innovations.
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Figure 3. The cyclic automobile industry: automobile
operating incomes for Ford and Chrysler from 1970 to
1993. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University
Press.
Perhaps the most innovation sti¯ing were
the hierarchical functional organizations with-
in each regional operation that have been
described as `chimneys' for their hierarchical
depth. Despite an abundance of evidence that




activities in the automotive industry are best
undertaken with a lot of cooperation and
interaction between functional groups or
using project teams (Allen, 1984; Wheel-
wright and Clark, 1992), Ford's chimneys
seemed designed to discourage any such
cooperation. The organizational structure,
incentives and systems/processes discouraged
the kind of cooperation that innovation so
deeply depends on. Each function had its own
goals and perspective. Donald Peterson, a
former Ford chief executive of®cer (CEO), put
it best:
. . . You dealt only with issues that the
Statements of Authorities and Responsibil-
ities said were yours. You learned real fast
to stay inside your limits . . . there was little
or no interaction and no problem solving.
What's more, the ®nancial rewards were
geared to results in managing your own
chimney. Top management knew this was a
problem, but there were historical barriers
in the way. An entire layer of people at the
chimney tops Ð . . . Ð had come up
through their respective chimneys and had
enormous loyalty to their former collea-
gues. It was civil war at the top. The
question was never, `Are we winning
against the Japanese?' but rather, `Are we
winning against each other?' You had to
reach your objectives, even if they were in
con¯ict with the other chimneys or in
con¯ict with the broader objectives of the
company. . . (Pelofsky M and L Schleisinger,
p. 11).
What is Ford 2000? Ð the Strategy
With all of these problems hiding under an
otherwise sound 1994 ®nancial balance sheet,
Ford's chairman and CEO, Alex Trotman,
decided to pursue a different global strategy.
He decided to integrate Ford's worldwide
product development, manufacturing, supply,
marketing and sales activities. The company's
North American Automotive Operations, Eur-
opean Automotive Operations and the Auto-
motive Components Group were merged into
a single operating unit called Ford Automative
Operations (FAO). Product development,
previously undertaken independently by each
operation was integrated into ®ve VPCs with
each VPC having worldwide responsibility for
the design, development and engineering of
new automobile models for a particular
worldwide market segment. The VPCs in-
cluded four in Detroit Ð large front wheel
drive (FWD), rear wheel drive cars, light
trucks and commercial trucks Ð and one in
Europe split between the Ford research and
engineering centres in Dunton (UK) and
Merkenich (Germany) for small/medium
FWD cars. Each VPC was made up of
members from different functions giving it a
project structure. Manufacturing, supply,
marketing and sales operations now had a
matrix structure as against the hierarchical
functional structures that hindered innovative
efforts before. In time, Ford Asia Paci®c Auto-
motive and other operations would follow the
same consolidation.
Analysis
The question now was: would the change in
strategy from multidomestic to global, and in
organizational structure from the functional
chimneys to a project orientation allow Ford
to better innovate while keeping costs low.
The strategic change
The change from multidomestic to global
offers several bene®ts. First, by eliminating the
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duplication of value chain activities, the ®rm
saves on product development, manufac-
turing and bureaucratic costs. Second, by
producing a standard product for the world
that uses standard parts, the ®rm can enjoy
economies of scale. In particular, it can
command more bargaining power over sup-
pliers than before. Such bargaining power
allows Ford to not only lower its cost of
components, but also have earlier access to
supplier innovations than competitors with
less power. The new strategy also allows Ford
to reduce the number of suppliers and
increase their participation in engineering
design of cars. Such cooperation not only
reduces the cost of producing cars but also
increases the quality of the resulting cars
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Ford estimated
that it would be able to save as much as $3
billion in cost per year by 2000 with $11
billion between 1996 and 2000 (Naughton,
1996). With the automobile industry, like
computers, depending more and more on
supplier innovations, maintaining supplier
relations that facilitate the ¯ow of such
innovations to manufacturers is critical. It
was estimated that more than 50% of the
content of cars would be electronic in the
not too far future. Such dependence on com-
ponents whose core concepts are funda-
mentally different from those that underpin
the traditional internal combustion engine
automobile underscore the importance of
supplier relations and the need for a global
strategy.
Finally, by consolidating its R&D, Ford
stood to bene®t from the economies of scale
that can come from larger scale R&D. The
question is if such cost savings and the
potential increase in supplier-generated inno-
vations are enough to overcome the main
disadvantage of the global strategy Ð not
being close enough to customers to quickly
respond to their needs. By locating the VPCs
in Detroit, will Ford not be too far from
worldwide customers to incorporate their
preferences and expectations in its new cars?
The answer rests in how well the ®rm is able
to exploit complementary innovations such as
information and communications techno
-logies (ITC) and computer-aided design tools.
Exploiting ITC
Without ITC, Ford is better able to respond to
local customer needs using a multidomestic
strategy as shown in Figure 4. With ITC,
however, the range over which Ford can
pursue a global strategy as against a multi-
domestic one increases. How? There are two
ways this would happen. First, ITC help
reduce the need to be physically present in a
country in order to discern local customer
needs and preferences. For example, market-
ers in Italy can look at the rotating image of a
new car design, being developed in Detroit,
on a computer work station in Milan and
suggest changes by marking up parts of the
car. These suggestions are instantaneously
received and evaluated in Detroit. Customers
all over the world can give Ford feedback on a
new car design by viewing three-dimensional
images of the car on the Web or test driving it
via interactive virtual reality. Effectively, ITC
reduce the need to be physically present in a
country to respond to local needs. As shown
in Figure 5, this is tantamount to shifting the
line AB upwards and increasing the area over
which the Global and International strategies
can be pursued. But the use of ITC increases
technological uncertainty since Ford now not
only has to worry about the technological
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Figure 4. Ford Motor Company before Ford 2000.
Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.
knowledge that underpins the product but
also about ITC. This is re¯ected in Figure 5 by
a shift in CD leftwards. The shifts in CD and
AB amount to increasing the area over which
Ford can pursue a global strategy as against a
multidomestic one. That is, the proper use of
ITC can allow Ford to take advantage of the
cost bene®ts of a global strategy while not
giving up local responsiveness.
ITC reduce the need to be
physically present in a
country to respond to local
needs
The other way ITC helps increase the range
over which the global strategy can be pursued
is by in¯uencing worldwide consumer tastes.
With worldwide TV networks such as CNN,
the World Wide Web and networks of
travellers, multinationals can in¯uence custo-
mer tastes, preferences and needs worldwide
through advertising via these media (Levitt,
1983). By in¯uencing what customers want, a
®rm is reducing the need to collect market
information. This is tantamount to shifting AB
in Figure 4 upwards, increasing the area over
which the global and international strategies
can be pursued. Again, by adding ITC to the
equation, the net effect is to increase
technological uncertainty effectively shifting
CD to the left. The net effect again is to
increase the area over which the global
strategy can be pursued.
ITC can also play another role. They can
allow engineers in Japan, Germany and the US
to work on the same car, with each group
handing over the job to the next group at the
end of their work day, allowing work to be
carried on almost round the clock, accelerat-
ing the time that it takes to develop and
launch a car.
Finally, suppose, using ITC or otherwise,
Ford were able to collect all the local market
information it needed to offer just what
customers want. The question still is how it
would incorporate all of the information into a
world car. Does the ®rm risk producing a
McCar that customers all of the world do not
want? Not necessarily. The ®rm can learn from
what microchip makers have done so success-
fully in selling a type of chip called ASIC
(applications-speci®c integrated circuits). The
core product is the same for all customers. But
the last stage of the manufacturing process
allows the ®rm to tailor the product to speci®c
needs of different customers. Ford can design
cars that use the same standard components
and features up to some level. Then through
¯exible manufacturing and improved design
tools, customization can be achieved for each
local country or region. The company can
take it further; it can allow individuals to
specify what they want in a car and Ford
would build the car to individual tastes.
Organizational structure and systems
To support its global strategy, Ford is effectively
moving from its very hierarchical functional
structure to two types of structures: a project
structure for product development and a matrix
structure for the manufacturing, sales, supply
and production supply.
Functional to project for product
development
In the project structure of the VPCs, engineers
with functional skills in design, engineering,
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Figure 5. ITC allow Ford to have the bene®ts of a
global strategy without sacri®cing all the bene®ts of a
multidomestic strategy. Reprinted by permission of
Oxford University Press.
manufacturing and marketing are assigned
permanently to a vehicle design centre and
report to the head of the vehicle centre
instead of the heads of their functional areas
(Figure 6). The project structure allows for
better interaction of team members, and has
been shown to be most effective in product
development (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).
With one executive responsible for concept,
design, development and engineering, the
company effectively has a so-called heavy-
weight project manager. And having a heavy-
weight project manager in automobile
development can reduce lead times, total
engineering hours (and therefore cost, all else
equal) and improve design quality (Clark and
Fujumoto, 1991). At Ford, it used to take 22
meetings and over two months to get a new-
car project approved. With 2000, it takes less
than a month.
One disadvantage of the project structure is
that by assigning employees from different
functions to the project, their knowledge may
become dated since they are not within their
functional units where they are more likely to
keep abreast of changes in the knowledge that
underpins their functions. How dated a
project member's knowledge becomes is a
function of the project's duration and the rate
of change of the knowledge that underpins
the employee's area of expertise (Allen,
1984). Since the technological knowledge
that underlies the internal combustion engine
automobile does not change that much but
customers' tastes change and do so often, a
project structure would be better for car
development than would the functional
structure that Ford has used for decades.
Functional to matrix for manufacturing,
marketing and sales and purchasing
Ford 2000 uses the matrix organizational
structure for manufacturing, marketing and
sales, and purchasing. In the matrix structure,
managers have two bossesÐone in a VPC and
the other in a functional area (Figure 6). This
structure has two primary advantages. The
®rst is better skills upgradability. How? In
innovative activities such as design, develop-
ment, manufacturing and sale of automobiles,
individuals need so-called T-skills (Iansiti,
1993), that is, deep expertise in one func-
tional area combined with broad enough
knowledge in others to see the linkages
between them. A matrix organization allows
individuals to maintain these skills by staying
in their functional areas while actively
participating in product development or other
project activity. The second is the sharing of
expertise. The functional expertise of a
particularly good individual can be used on
more than one project. One drawback of the
matrix organization is the dual boss phenom-
enon. Not knowing who is responsible for
evaluating and rewarding or punishing per-
formance can be a problem especially when a
®rm's values and goals are not shared by all
managers.
Discussion and conclusions
In moving from multidomestic to global, Ford
is trying to follow a strategy that Honda and
Toyota have pursued for years. While building
cars with common platforms and peripheral
local customization would be better than
building an Escort whose European and
American versions have completely different
platforms, Ford's strategy would only amount
to catching up to competitors. The question
is, why stop at common platforms and local
customization? Why end customization at the
local level? Why not pursue individual
customization? Rather than pre-customize cars
for different regions, why not follow the
semiconductor industry example and build
cars up to some level (call it the platform) and
then use vastly available ITC to customize cars
according to individual customer tastes. A
customer could place an order from her/his
house and Ford would have the car ready in
ten days. Such a system would also allow the
company to collect useful information on
customer tastes and preferences.
Whether Ford offers product customization
at the individual or regional level, a critical
component of the multidomestic-to-global
change is the use of technology to better
respond to local customer needs, harness
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7 Figure 6. 1994 Ford 2000 Organization
intellectual capability, and in¯uence customer
tastes and preferences. The assumption here
is that Ford will be able to integrate these
technologies with its other skills. This may
prove to be a major hurdle in itself.
The change from a functional structure to a
matrix one poses several potential problems
for Ford. Many employees will have two
bosses whose goals and self-interests may be
vastly different, given the existence of the
`chimneys' discussed earlier. Which of these
two bosses would the employee satisfy? How
quickly do the employees pick up the T-skills
that they need to function in these new capa-
cities? What new reward systems encourage
the building of T-skills that are now critical to
major ®rm activities. How does the ®rm
measure the performance of an employee in
a matrix organization who must satisfy two
bosses and contribute to both project and
functional activities? What reward systems
foster shared values as against empire build-
ing?
The ®rm's empowerment and diversity
programmes, like its new strategy, have been
adopted by other companies for years. Wal-
Mart has been practising empowerment since
the 1960s. If Ford really wants a competitive
advantage, could it not pursue other organiza-
tional behaviour inventions?
In general, there are still many questions to
be asked. How will political power be used in
the ®rm? How does it deal with employee and
union mental models of what it takes to thrive
in the automobile business? Will it take
another crisis such as those in 1972, 1980
and 1991 Ð when US automakers lost a lot of
money Ð to rally everyone behind the new
programme? Might such a crisis not, in fact, be
an excuse for people to want to revert to the
old multidomestic strategy? How does one
change 320,000 people from different na-
tional cultures? What would it take to
motivate all these people? What kinds of
performance measures and reward systems
are appropriate?
Although the strategic change from multi-
domestic to global is appropriate, it may not
have gone far enough. In any case, to get the
best out of the strategy, Ford must implement
it well, moulding the right organizational
structure, systems/processes, and the right
people in the right positions. It must integrate
into its systems, the right ITC. Optimal
performance requires a ®t between strategy,
structure, systems/processes and people.
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